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ADMIRLTY-AFEIGHTMENT CoNTRACs-PREPAID FREIGHT UNRECOVERABLE
ALTHOUGH VESSEL DID NOT SA.L.-A sailing vessel in New York had loaded a
cargo for Bordeaux and was about to sail when the Government embargoed all
voyages of sailing vessels to the war zone. The ship thereupon* discharged the
cargo. The freight had been prepaid, under a bill of lading containing the clause
"Freight . . . to be prepaid in full without discount retained and irrevo-
cably, ship and/or cargo lost or not lost," and the usual "restraint of princes"
exception. The cargo-owners libelled the vessel for the return of the prepaid
freight. Held, that they were not entitled to recover. Hand, J., dissenting.
The Gracie D. Chambers (ii8, C. C. A. 2nd) 253 Fed. 182.
On analogous facts, a similar result was reached in The Bris (1x18, S. D.
N. Y.) 253 Fed. 259.
It is admitted that in these cases the freight had not been earned and, if not
prepaid, could not have been recovered by the shipowner. The Tornado (1882)
io8 U. S. 342, 2 Sup. Ct. 746. Even though prepaid, if the voyage remain
uncompleted without any participation in the default by the cargo-owner, the
prepaid freight may in the United States be recovered from the shipowner.
Watson v. Duykinck (i8o8, N. Y. Sup. C) 3 Johns. 335; Griggs v. Austin
(x825, Mass.) 3 Pick. 20. The decision in the instant case, therefore, must
rest on the exceptional agreement to the contrary in the bill of lading, and to
reach this conclusion the majority interpolated the word "retained" after
"irrevocably," to make the phrase read "irrevocably retained." An analogous,
though less doubtful, clause was similarly construed in National Steam Nay.
Co. v. International Paper Co. (1917, C. C. A. 2nd) 241 Fed. 861. This con-
cededly inequitable result of denying the recovery by the shipper of -unearned
but prepaid freight is reached in England without any special agreement to that
effect. Coker v. Limerick S. S. Co. (1918, H. L.) 34 Times L. R. 2A6. The
Court of Exchequer has admitted that the rule is unsatisfactory in principle but
considered it too well-established to overrule. Byrne v. Schiller (1871, Exch.)
I Aspinwall Mar. Cas. III. The dissenting judge in the instant case, in view
of the doubtful wording of the clause, construed it to apply only after the
vessel had broken ground. See The Tornado. (i882) supra, at p. 349 (as to
time of commencement of the contract of affreightment), and The Allanwilde
(1917, D. N. J.) 247 Fed. 236 (where the vessel put back to port on account
of distress). The court's dictum that "freight is earned only upon delivery of
cargo" has many exceptions; it does not apply, for example, where force
majeure terminates the voyage before completion, the shipper. waiving delivery
or voluntarily accepting his cargo at an intermediate port, or where the non-
delivery is in part due to the act or default of the shipper. See The Nathaniel
Hooper (1839, C. C. Mass.) Fed. Cas. 10,032, an able opinion by Mr. Justice
Story; Hunter v. Prinsep (18o8, K. B.) .io East 378, 394; Cargo ex Galam
(1863) 33 L. J. Adm. 97.
ALIEN ENEIFs--SUIT IN NEUTRAL FORUMd-CHANGE IN STATUS OF FORUM
FRo NEUTRALITY TO BELLIGERENCY PENDING APPEAL.-The plaintiff, a British
company, sued out a libel in the federal District Court in New York against
a vessel there in port belonging to the defendant, an Austrian comnany, to
enforce payment for coal delivered at Algiers by the plaintiff to the defendant
before the declaration of war between Great Britain and Austria. From a
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judgment dismissing the libel an appeal was taken. While it was pending, war
on Austria was declared by the United States. Held, that in view of the
change of status of the United States from neutrality to co-belligerency with
the plaintiff's country against the defendant's country, the decree of dismissal
must be reversed, but that action upon the libel should be suspended until
peace should remove the difficulty of communication between the defendant's
officers in Austria and its American counsel. Watts, Watts & Co. Ltd. v.
Unione Austriaca di Navigazione (1918, U. S.) 39 Sup. Ct .
The case is divisible into two distinct parts, covering (i) the period of
American neutrality, and (2) the period of belligerency. A United States
court is privileged in its discretion to assume jurisdiction over a suit between
foreigners, although the contract out of which it arose was made and was
to be performed in a foreign country. Such jurisdiction is usually assumed
unless reasons of expediency or treaty provisions forbid. The ERwine Kreplin
(1872, D. C. E. D. N. Y.) 9 Blatch. 438 (treaty). Reasons of expediency
forbid the assumption of jurisdiction, for example, when access to the
national courts of the parties is easy, the cause of action being governed by
their national law, and when the suit is for seamen's wages. See Montalet v.
Murray (18o7, U. S.) 4 Cranch, 46 (suit on promissory notes made in St.
Domingo); Willendson v. The Fdrsaket (i8ox, D. C. Penn.) i Pet. Adm. 197
(seaman's suit for wages) ; see also Panama Railroad Co. v. Napier Shipping
Co. (896) 166 U. S. 28o, 285, 17 Sup. Ct. 572. Jurisdiction is never declined
where the case arises communis juris and involves the application of law com-
mon to all nations. Mason v. Blaireau (1804, U. S.) 2 Cranch 24o, 264
(salvage) ; The Belgenland (1884) 114 U. S. 355, 365, 5 Sup. Ct 86o (involving
a collision on the high seas between foreign vessels) and other cases there
cited. Inasmuch as in the instant case the general rule of international law
and the law of the country of the plaintiff, of the defendant and of the forum
were in harmony, to the effect that the payment of money during war by the
subject of one belligerent to the subject of another is unlawful, it is unques-
tionable that the District Court had power to assume jurisdiction, although the
refusal to exercise it to enforce payment by the defendant during the war was
a proper use of its discretion as a court of a neutral nation. This was the
ground of decision dismissing the libel. See 224 Fed. i88. After war broke
out between the United States and Austria, the legal situation of the parties
changed. The case became a suit by one belligerent in the court of a co-bel-
ligerent against a common enemy. The refusal to exercise jurisdiction must
then rest on other grounds. It is a common rule that in the case of contracts
executed prior to war, a state of war does not render them void, but merely
suspends the remedy for their enforcement. Ex parte Boussmaker (1806, Ch.)
13 Ves. 71. This rule suspends suits brought by alien enemy plaintiffs. Plain-
tiffs are also barred by the rule that non-resident alien enemies have no standing
in judicio. Neither rule grants to 'alien enemy defendants immunity from suit.
See Robinson v. Continental Insurance Co. [1915] I K. B. 155, I61; McVeigh v'.
United States (1870, U. S.) ii Wall. 259, 267; and article by C. M. Picciotto in
(1917) 27 YALE: LAW JOURNAL, 167, 173. But principles of civilized justice
require that an enemy defendant have full opportunity to be heard in defence
and to communicate with counsel. Windsor v. McVeigh (1876) 93 U. S. 274,
280; The Kaiser Wilhelm 1I (1917, C. C. A. 3rd) 246 Fed. 786, 79o. This
principle was applied by the Supreme Court in the instant case, rotwithstand-
ing a stipulation as to the facts and the proof of foreign law entered into at
the beginning of the suit by the defendant's counsel. The decision is novel
but seems in accord with established principles.
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CONSTrIUTIONAL LA- ADmIRALTY JURIsDIcTIN-Acr OF CONGRESS REIVING
STATE COMPENSATION LAWS rOR MARITImE INJuRms.-The claimant, a steve-
dore, was injured while at work on board ship on February 26, I918. By Act
of October 6, i917, Congress amended the Judicial Code dealing with the grant
of admiralty jurisdiction to federal courts, so as to save "to claimants 
the
rights and remedies under the compensation law of any state." On April 17,
i918, the New York Legislature re-enacted the compensation law previously
held unconstitutional as to maritime injuries in the Jensen case. Held, that
the claimant was entitled to compensation under the New York Workmen's
Compensation Law. Ciinmino v. JThn T. Clark & Son (1918, App. Div.) 172
N. Y. Supp. 478.
This is another attempt to evade the unfortunate results of the decision 
in
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen (1917) 244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct 524, discussed,
in (917) 7 YALE LANw JoURNAL, 255. The court relies without comment 
upon
the Act of Congress of Oct. 6, 1917, 40 U. S. St. at L. 395. It does not 
discuss
the questions as to the constitutionality and effectiveness of this Act, 
referred
to in the Comment thereon in (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 
924, 926. It
merely cites and relies upon the case there criticised, Veasey v. Peters 
(1918,
La.) 77 So. 948. Assuming the constitutionality of the Congressional 
Act, an
interesting question arises whether the remedies it purports to save to 
claimants
can be availed of without a re-enactment after the passage of the Act 
of Con-
gress of the state compensation laws. Apparently. in order to avoid 
giving the
New York law of April i7, 1918, a retroactive operation, the court held 
that it
was unnecessary to re-enact the provisions of the prior compensation 
law relat-
ing to maritime injuries and that these provisions were revived and made 
oper-
ative by the mere passage of the Act of Congress. This, it is submitted, 
raises
a very debatable question. The analogy, suggested by the court, of 
state stat-
utes validly passed but suspended while acts of Congress are in 
force, seems
not well taken. In view of the Jensen case, the situation is rather 
one of "a
law enacted in the unauthorized exercise of a power exclusively 
confided to
Congress." See Re Rahrer (18gi) 140 U. S. 545, 565, Il Sup. Ct. 865, 
875. Nor
does the case which the court relies upon-Allison v. Corker (i9go) 
67 N. J. L.
596, 6o0, 52 Atl. 362, 363-supply authority for the 
proposition claimed, for
that case held only that a statute which is unconstitutional may, 
after removal
of the constitutional restriction, be imported into valid legislation 
by appro-
priate reference, the matter being one purely of identification. It is 
commonly
declared that an unconstitutional statute is ibsolutely null and is 
not validated
by subsequent removal of the constitutional restriction. Nortoh 
v. Shelby
County (1886) 118 U. S. 425, 442, 6 Sup. Ct. 1121, 1125 (semble); 
State v.
Tufly (i8go) 2o Nev. 427, 22 Pac. 1054 (statute void in toto) ; 
Cooley, Const.
Limitations (7th ed.) 259. This principle, if sound as applied 
to a statute
unconstitutional in part, as Cooley declares, is contrary to the court's 
decision.
But at least one New York case, though not cited by the court, 
furnishes some
support for its opinion. People v. Roberts (1896) 148 N. Y. 36o, 42 
N. E. io82
(state civil service law unconstitutional as applied to a certain 
office). The
problem can scarcely be settled by logic. A statute void in toto 
may well be
treated as thrown into the discard, and it would be inconvenient, 
when a con-
stitutional restriction is removed, to have to search all such discarded 
legisla-
tion to see if it were not revived. But 'vhere a statute has 
in the main
remained operative, the extension of it to a new field, within 
its terms but
excluded by a constitutional restriction now removed, seems 
somewhat less
unreasonable.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT-JURISDICTION TO ASSESS
STOCKHOLDERS.-IIn proceeding against a Minnesota corporation, a Minnesota
court which had jurisdiction of the corporation entered an order appointing a
receiver and laying an assessment on the stockholders. The receiver brought
suit in North Dakota to enforce the assessment against one of the stock-
holders who apparently had not been served personally in the Minnesota pro-
ceedings. The North Dakota court found that the corporation was a manu-
facturing corporation within the meaning of a provision of the constitution of
Minnesota, which declares that all stockholders in any corporation other than
those organized for manufacturing and mechanical purposes, shall be liable to
creditors to the amount of their stock, and concluded that the order laying theassessment was made without such jurisdiction as was necessary to bind thedefendant. A writ of error was taken to the Supreme Court of the United
States. Held, that the court of North Dakota had denied to the Minnesota
proceedings the faith and credit to which they were entitled under the consti-
tution and laws of the United States. Brandeis, Clarke and Pitney, JJ., dis-
senting. Matin v. Augedahl (i9x8) 38 Sup. Ct. 452.
The order of the Minnesota court was entitled to enforcement against the
defendant in North Dakota only if it was made by a court having jurisdiction
of the subject matter and of the defendant. As regards personal service uponthe defendant it had been settled by various decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States that "as to all matters relating to the amount, proprietyand necessity of the assessment," with respect to which the order of the court
was expressly made conclusive by the laws of Minnesota, the stockholders
are so far in privity with the corporation as to be represented by it. Hawkins
v. Hamilton (1889) 131 U. S. 319, 9 Sup. Ct. 739; Selig v. Hamilton (0914)
234 U. S. 652, 34 Sup. Ct. 936; see also Royal Arcanum v. Green (1915) 237
U. S. 531, 35 Sup. Ct. 724, and Comment in (i916) 25 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 324.
The order could not be attacked therefore for want of jurisdiction over thedefendant either under the due process clause or the full faith and credit
clause of the federal constitution. Did the Minnesota court have jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter? There is no reasonable doubt that the
corporation was a manufacturing corporation within the meaning of the con-stitutional provision of Minnesota. The order of the court was therefore
erroneous. But unless the court was without jurisdiction the error could be
corrected only by a direct application to the court or by appeal. A judgment
cannot be impeached collaterally within or without the state with respect to
the merits of the case. Black, Judgments, secs. "245, 857. The order layingthe assessment involved necessarily a decision by the Minnesota court that
the corporation belonged to the class whose stock was assessable. Such a find-ing was clearly binding in Minnesota upon all stockholders. Merchants' Nat.
Bank v. Minn. Thresher Mfg. Co. (i9o3) go Minn. 144, 149, 95 N. W. 767, 769.
Was 'the finding also binding in North Dakota? On this point there is much
obscurity in the decisions. Thompson v. Whitman (1873, U. S.), 18 Wall. 457,
laid down the doctrine that the record of a sister state might be contradicted
as to jurisdictional facts asserted therein and even as to the facts stated to have
been passed upon by the court. A more recent case holds that there has been
no departure from that doctrine. National Exchange Bank v. Wiley (904)
i95 U. S. 257, 25 Sup. Ct. 70. It is submitted, however, that the doctrine should
be limited to cases in which the facts are necessary to confer jurisdiction in
the international sense. Whenever jurisdiction exists from an international
point of view a finding of facts necessary to confer jurisdiction in the munic-
ipal sense should be conclusive until set aside by the courts of the state in
which it was rendered, not only within the state but also outside of the state,under the full faith and credit clause. See Pemberton v. Hughes (C. A.)
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[1899] 1 Ch. 781. Minnesota was competent, as regards international jurisdic-
tion, to impose a statutory liability upon the stockholders of a Minnesota cor-
poration. Whether it had exercised that power with respect to a particular
corporation was purely a question of internal law. A decision on that point
by the local courts should be free from collateral attack everywhere. In
reaching the result that the order of the Minnesota court was entitled to
full faith and credit in North Dakota the Supreme Court did not base its
conclusion upon the distinction suggested above, although much of the rea-
soning of the court is in accord with such distinction. The decision rests
nominally upon the ground that it was not the intention of the constitutional
provisfon of Minnesota to affect the jurisdiction of the state courts. Applying
the test laid down in Fauntleroy v. Lum (1908) 210 U. S. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. 641,
the court regarded the provision as going to the duty of the court and not to
its power. The question, from this point of view, is one of construction
which, when its affects a court of general jurisdiction, will be resolved in
favor of jurisdiction. In view of the fact that the constitutional provision
did not deal expressly with the jurisdiction of courts, but with the liability of
stockholders, and the further fact that the order in question was made by a
court of general jurisdiction in connection with proceedings for sequestration,
the case would seem to fall reasonably within the rule just stated.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FuLL FAITH AND CaDiT-SuiT IN ILLINOIS ON ALA-
BAMA JUDGMENT FOR WRONGFUL DEATH.-The defendants by their acts in
Alabama had caused the death in that state of the plaintiff's intestate. The
plaintiff obtained judgment in Alabama under the wrongful death statute of
that state. Thereafter the plaintiff brought the present action in Illinois, basing
his claim on the Alabama judgment. An Illinois statute provided that "no
action shall be brought or prosecuted in this state to" recover for damages for
a death occurring outside of this state." Held, that the Illinois court had no
jurisdiction over the plaintiff's action, and that the statute so construed did not
violate the "full faith and credit" clause of the U. S. Constitution. Kenney
v. Supreme Lodge, etc., Loyal Order of Moose (1918, Ill.) 12o N. E. 631.
See COMMENTS, p. 264.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PuBLIc LANDS-POWER OF UNITED STATES TO EXEMPT
HOMESTEADS FROM ATTACHMENT FOR PRIOR DEur.-In August 1912 the United
States under the provisions of the federal statute as to granting homesteads
conveyed land in Idaho to the plaintiff in fee simple. Under the terms of this
statute land so acquired was not to "become liable to the satisfaction of any
debt" of the grantee "contracted prior to the issuing of the patent therefor."
U. S. Rev. St. sec. 2296. A creditor whose claim against the plaintiff accrued
before the conveyance brought suits attaching the land and, after judgment,
levied executions on the same. The plaintiff then brought the present proceed-
ing to have the liens declared invalid. Held, that the limitations of the Act of
Congress were valid and the land therefore was exempt from the creditor's
claims. Holmes, J., dubitans. Ruddy v. Rossi (Dec. 9, 1918) U. S. Sup. Ct.
Oct. Term, No. 17.
This case decides for the first time, so far as the Supreme Court is con-
cerned, the validity of the federal statute concerned. The decision follows the
current of authority in the state courts and the lower federal courts. See
annotations in U. S. Comp. St., 1916, p. 537o, note 2. It settles a constitutional
question of great theoretical interest as well as of practical importance. Has
the federal government the power to determine that land in a state, after it
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has ceased to be government property, shall not be subject to the state laws
regulating ownership, at least as far as the effects of the original grant by the
United States are concerned? Is the federal statute, as Mr. Justice Holmes
describes it, "a pure attempt [by the United States] to regulate the alienability
of land in Idaho by [federal] law, without regard to the will of Idaho?" Note
that the federal government retains no interest in the land--"there is no condi-
tion, no reserved right of entry, no reversion in the United States." "Owner-
ship" of property is of course a complex legal interest, i. e. a complex aggregate
of jural relations-rights, privileges, powers and immunities. When one pri-
vate person "transfers" real property to another what happens, from a legal
point of view, is that the complex legal interest of the grantor is divested and
the grantee is invested with a more or less similar aggregate of jural relations.
How similar depends partly upon the words used in the deed, but also
partly upon the legal effects attached to those words by the law of the jurisdic-
tion in which the land is situated. In final analysis, therefore, it is the law
which determines just what rights, etc., the new "owner" acquires. In the case
in hand, the land in question was, before the patent was issued, under the juris-
diction of the federal government; after it became private property it passed
under the jurisdiction of the State of Idaho, so that the legal effects of all sub-
sequent transfers of ownership would be determined by the law of that state.
The real question, therefore, seems to be this: may the United States in exer-
cising its constitutional power to dispose of lands belonging to it-a power
expressly granted by the Constitution-determine the legal effects of its own
instrument of transfer and so the exact scope of the rights, privileges, powers
and immunities which vest in the person to whom the patent is issued-all
without reserving to the United States any interest in the property? In spite
of the doubts of Mr. Justice Holmes, the majority of the court say that it
may, on the ground that such a power is "necessary and proper" for the
effective exercise of its undoubted power to dispose of the property in question.
The result is that those who acquire homesteads from the United States have
as a part of their complex legal interests-their "ownership" in fee simple-
immunities which other owners in fee do not have from the claims of a certain
class of creditors.
COPYRIGHTs-ROYALTIES-LIABILITY OF SuR-AssIGNEE TO ORIGINAL LIcENsoLR-
The plaintiff, owner of a copyright, assigned it to P, who undertook to pay a
royalty. P later became insolvent, and his receiver sold all the assets to the
defendant, the latter taking an assignment of the copyright and agreeing to
pay the royalty. The plaintiff sued this second assignee for royalties, claim-
ing as beneficiary of the latter's contract with the receiver and also by virtue
of a vendor's lien on the copyright Held, that he could not under English law
maintain suit as beneficiary of the contract, and that there was no lien in the
absence of any words in the original assignment to P indicating any such
intention. Barker v. Stickney (1918, K. B.) 11g L. T. Rep. 73.
See COMMENTS, P. 259.
CRIMINAL LAw-RoRBERY--ADmINISTRATION OF DRUG AS 'FoRcE."-The
defendant administered a drug to the person in charge of a saloon in order to
produce unconsciousness, and while the victim was in that state took money
from the cash register. The state statute defining robbery required the unlaw-
ful taking of the property to be "by means of force or violence or fear" but
added that "the degree of force is immaterial." Held, that the defendant was
guilty of robbery. State v. Snyder (1918, Ne .) 172 Pac. 364.
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The decision of the court is based upon the analogy of the cases which hold
that if drugs are used to make a woman unconscious and her person is then
violated, the crime of rape is committed. Regina v. Camplin (1845, C. C. R.)
I Den. C. C. 89, s. c., I Cox C. C. 22o. It must be noted, however, that to
constitute rape there need be no other force used than is necessary to accom-
plish the intercourse. If the woman is ravished while unconscious because of
drugs not administered by the accused; or if she is to the knowledge of the
accused insane and so. makes no resistance, rape is nevertheless committed.
Regina v. Fletcher (i859, C. C. R.) 8 Cox C. C. 131; contra, People v. Quin
(1865, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 5 Barb. 128 (statutory). On the other hand, robbery
is usually under our law distinguished by the presence of "force and violence"
or at least "putting in fear." Picking a person's pocket is therefore not rob-
bery, but merely larceny from the person. Harman's Case (17O1, K. B.) 2
East P. C. 736. If, however, the article stolen is attached to the person and
enough fore is used to sever the attachment, robbery is committed. Rex v.
Mason (182o, C. C. R.) R. & R. 419; contra, Bowlin v. State (19o4) 72 Ark.
530, 81 S. W. 838. Similarly, if the force used injures the prosecutor's person,
as where the woman's ear from which a ring was snatched was thereby torn.
Rex v. Lapier (1784) 1 Leach, 36o. Threats to use force which result in a
"putting in fear" hre also sufficient. Hughes Case (1825) I Lewin, 301. Was
there, then, in the principal case sufficient force, over and above that necessary
merely to take and carry away the money, to remove the offense from the field
of larceny from the person into that of robbery? More in point than the
authorities upon rape are the American cases holding that to induce another
to take a drug in the belief that it is a harmless article of food or drink is
to commit a criminal battery. Johnson v. State (1893) 92 Ga. 36, 17 S. E. 974.
An English case takes the same view. Reg. v. Button (1838) 8 C. & P. 66o.
Later cases, however, disagree. Reg. v. Hanson (1849) 2 C. & K. 912. The
American decisions are based upon the proposition that the chemical force
thus set in motion is "force" within the meaning of that term as used in
the definition of a battery. Commonwealth v. Stratton (1873) 114 Mass. 303.
If so, it would seem that the administration of the poison to the prosecutor-
the bringing of chemical force to bear upon his person-as a step in obtaining
the property may very properly be held to be the use of "force" within the
meaning of that word as used in the definition of robbery.
EvmENCE-CORONna's VERDicTS-ADMISSlBILITY IN PROCEEDING UNDER WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION LAw.-In a proceeding before the Industrial Board of
Illinois for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law, the Board
admitted in evidence a coroner's verdict that the deceased died from injuries
which "resulted from a fall down a flight of stairs at Morris & Co.'s plant
. . . as he was leaving his work." Held, that the evidence was admissible
to show the circumstances under which the injury was received. Cartright,
Dunn and Cook, JJ., dissenting. Morris & Co. v. Industrial Board (1918, IIl.)
i1g N. E. 944.
In a similar proceeding the same Board admitted a coroner's verdict to the
effect that the deceased "came to his death from septic'mia, due to a cut on
his finger from fiber cane, accidentally received wfiile in the discharge of his
duties for the Peoria Cordage Co." Held, that the verdict was not admissible
to show the circumstances under which the injury was received. Fanner, Car-
ter and Craig, JJ., dissenting. Peoria Cordage Co. v,. Industrial Board (1918,
Ili.) 11g N. E. 996.
These two cases decided on the same day reveal a struggle within the court
over the extent to which coroner's inquisitions are admissible in civil cases.
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Note that the writer of the dissenting opinion in the first case is the author
of the prevailing opinion in the second. Early common law cases seem to have
admitted, coroner's inquisitions as evidence in civil cases. Toomes v. Ethering-
ton (i66o) i Win. Saund. 361. They may be regarded as falling under the
general exception to the hearsay rule which renders duly authorized official
statements admissible. Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 1671. The tendency on the
part of courts to-day is to exclude them as hearsay. Hollister v. Cordero (1888)
76 Cal. 849, 18 Pac. 855; Wigmore, loc. cit. Illinois has a long line of cases
admitting them. U. S. Life Ins. Co. v. Vocke (1889) 129 Ill. 557, 22 N. E. 467
collects the authorities and has excellent opinions by Craig and Baker, JJ.
The facts found, however, must not be "extraneous to the province of the
inquest." Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Taylor (1892) 46 Ill. App. 5o6 (ver-
dict admitted to show how deceased came to his death, but not a finding that
"the switchstand was negligently placed'). The finding in the second of the
cases in hand, that the deceased came to his death "while in the discharge of
his duties," seems to fall without the province of the coroner's inquest and
therefore was rightly held inadmissible under prior Illinois cases. The first
case may be distinguished on the ground that there is no similar finding, but
merely a statement of the facts. It should be noted that the Illinois Industrial
Board are bound by the common law rules of evidence. Victor Chemical
Works v. Industrial Board (1916) 274 Ill. IX, 113 N. E. 173. Whether this is
desirable or not depends in part upon the spirit of liberality or narrowness in
which the rules of evidence are administered. In some states the Compensa-
tion Law frees the compensation boards or commissioners from following these
rules. See Conn. Pub. Acts, 1913, ch. 138, part B, see. 25; N. Y. Laws, 19x4,
ch. 41, see. 68.
LEGACIES AND DEviSES--RLFASE OF LEGACY CHARGED upoN LAND DEVSED--
VENDOR'S LiEN-A testator bequeathed and devised all his estate to his son
"subject to" certain specific legacies. A portion of the estate was real prop-
erty. The legatees, in consideration of the son's promise to pay them the
amounts of their legacies, executed in gio quitclaim deeds of the lands so
devised. The son did not pay the legacies; and in 1916, after the promises
to pay the amounts of the legacies were barred by the statute of limitations,
one of the legatees, to whom the other legatees had meanwhile assigned their
claims against the son, brought a bill in equity for the foreclosure of an
alleged vendor's lien on the real property in question. Held, that the plaintiff
was entitled to a foreclosure decree. Ostrander, C. J., dissenting. Lavin v.
Lynch (1918, Mich.) 168 N. W. io24.
The decision is placed by the majority of the court on the following
grounds: (I) that the specific legatees each originally had an equitable charge
or lien on the lands in question to secure the payment of his legacy; (2) that
when each legatee quitclaimed to J., he acquired a "vendor's lien" in equity to
secure the payment of the "purchase price" of his interest; (3) that this
vendor's lien was assignable; (4) that the running of the statute of limitations
against the promise to pay the price did not affect the validity of the lien.
Ostrander, C. J., took the view that by a fair construction of the will, which
apparently carried personalty as well as realty, the legacies never were a charge
on the real estate and that therefore the quitclaim deeds conveyed nothing and
had no effect except to clear up doubts upon that matter. So far as the con-
struction of the will is concerned, the view taken by the dissenting judge seems
the better. Assuming, however, the correctness of the views of the majority
upon this point, their second point seems open to serious question. Previous
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cases in Michigan had accepted the doctrine of "vendor's liens" and bad
applied it to the purchase and sale of equitable interests. Ortmann v. Plum-
mer (1885) 52 Mich. 76, 17 N. W. 703. In the principal case, however, we are
confronted by the fact that the interests sought to be "conveyed," i. e., released
or extinguished, by the quitclaim deeds were equitable liens on land owned by
the one to whom they were "conveyed." If, as the majority opinion holds, the
legatees after executing these deeds still had equitable liens on the land for
the same amounts as before, it is difficult to see that the deeds had any effect
whatever. Indeed the object of the whole transaction between the son and
the legatees seems to have been to extinguish at the time the deeds were given
any claims the latter had against the property and to take in exchange the
son's personal legal duty to pay the amounts of the legacies. By holding that
the legatees still had equitable liens this purpose is entirely defeated. The
result reached by the majority seems therefore to be incorrect, even if we
assume their construction of the will. It may be noted that by accepting the
property given by the will the son had already placed himself under a personal
duty to each of the legatees to pay him the amount of his legacy. Burch v.
Burch (1875) 52 Ind. 36; Ames, Cases on Trusts (2d ed.) 3, n. 2.
MARIGE AND DIVORcE-ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE-FRAUDULENT CONCEAL-
MENT OF NATIONALITY IN TIME OF WAR.-A French woman married on August
24, 1914, in Paris, a person who claimed to be an Alsatian by birth and a
Frenchman by nationality. He was in fact a German who was born in Darm-
stadt, Germany. The wife petitioned for an annulment of the marriage.
Held, that she was entitled to a decree of annulment. Re Schoenberg (1918,
Tribunal Civil de la Seine) 45 CLUNET 666.
See COMMENTS, p. 272.
QUAsi-CoNTRAcTs-EFFECT OF ExPREss CoNTRAcT INDUcED BY FRAUD-
MEAsURE OF RECOVERY.-The plaintiff sued for the reasonable value of work
and labor done for the defendant, and to a plea that the work was done under
an express contract replied that the contract was induced by the defendant's
fraud. The value of the work done was more than the contract price. Held,
that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover in indebitatus assumpsit except
upon the express contract, and that damages were limited to the agreed price.
Prest v. Farmington (1918, Me.) IO4 Atl. 52x.
See COMMENTS, p. 255.
RFs JuDiCATA-IDExTITY OF PARTIES AND CAUSES OF ACTION-JDGMENT FOR
WIFE NoT CONCLUSIVE IN HUSBANDs ACTION FOR Loss OF SEavIc.-In a former
suit, the plaintiff's wife obtained judgment against the defendant for personal
injuries caused by negligence. The plaintiff brought the present action for
loss of his wife's service, and the court charged the jury that the wife's judg-
ment was conclusive as to the defendant's negligence and as to her freedom
from contributory negligence. Held, that the charge was erroneous. Laskozv-
ski v. People's Ice Co. (igi8 Mich.) 168 N. W. 940.
A judgment to be available as res judicata must be between the same parties,
or their privies, and for the same cause of action. 23 Cyc. 1237. The wife and
husband, since the enabling statutes of married women, can no longer be con-
sidered one party. A suit to which only one was a party is generally held not
to be res judicata in a suit brought by the other party, even when the husband
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must be joined as a nominal plaintiff or defendant. Solte v. Karren (1917, Tex.
Civ. App.) 191 S. W. 6oo; Thompson v. Southern Lumber Co. (1914) 113 Ark.
38o, 168 S. W. io68; contra, Lindsey v. Danville (1873) 46 Vt. 144. The prin-
cipal case could be supported on this ground alone. It is believed, however,
that as the wife's action was for injuries and the husband's for loss of service,
the causes of action cannot be considered identical, although both are based on
the same facts. See Fish v. Vanderlip (1915, N. Y.) 17o App. Div. 78o, 156 N.Y.
Supp. 38; Bradshaw v. Lancashire etc. Ry. Co. (1875, C. P.) L. R. Io C. P. i89.
If the act of the defendant injures two primary rights of the plaintiff, it is usu-
ally held that the latter may maintain two different actions. Brunsden v. Hum-
phrey (1884, C. A.) 14 Q. B. D. 141; Reilly v. Sicilian Asphalt Co. (192) 170
N. Y. 4o, 62 N. E. 772; contra, King v. Chicago; M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1goo)
8o Minn. 83, 82 N. W. 1113. A fortiori, when the rights violated belong to
different parties. See Mahoning Valley Ry. Co. v. Van Alstine (igos) 77 Oh.
St. 395, 83 N. E. 6oi. The doctrine of res judicata was established to protect
a wrongdoer against vexatious suits, "nemo bis vexari debet pro una et eadem
causa"; applied for that purpose it is very beneficial, but it should not be used
to relieve the plaintiff from proving his case.
TORTs-RIGHT OF PRIVACY-EXHIBITING MOVING PIcrURE OF PLAINTIFF WITH-
OUT HER CONSENT.-While the plaintiff was in the defendants' store purchasing
goods, the defendants without her knowledge caused moving picture films of
her face and figure to be taken, and later procured the films to be enlarged and
exhibited in a moving picture theatre to advertise their wares. The plaintiff
alleged that all this was done without her consent and that it caused people
to believe that she had for hire permitted her picture to be taken and used as
a. public advertisement. The answer was a general denial. No proof of
special damages was offered and the trial court sustained a demurrer to the
evidence. Held, that the defendants' acts were a violation of the plaintiff's
right of privacy and entitled her to recovery without proof of special damage.
Kunz v. Allen (1918, Kan.) 172 Pac. 532.
See COmmENTS, p. 269.
UNFAIR ComPETITION-SImILARITY IN APPEARANcE OF PRODUCT-"SHREDDED
WHEAT" CAsE.-The plaintiff corporation manufactured a shredded wheat
biscuit of a peculiar size, form, color and appearance, which had become well-
known to the public as coming from a single source. It owned patents covering
the same. On the expiration of the patents, the defendants began to manu-
facture and sell wheat biscuits of exactly the same size, shape and appearance,
but put up in a distinctive package. Restaurants sold the biscuits to patrons
who did not see the original package. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to
have the defendant mark each biscuit intended for ultimate sale outside the
package with some mark which would enable the purchaser readily to distin-
guish it from the plaintiff's product, unless after a probationary period of six
months the defendant could show that such marking was not commercially
practicable. Ward, J., dissenting. Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell
Co. (1918, C. C. A. 2d.) 250 Fed. 96o.
The law relating to "unfair competition" is quite modern. No reference to
it will be found, for example, in the early editions of such works as Pollock's
Law of Torts. The harm sought to be prevented is not competition, but induc-
ing persons to buy the defendant's goods by representations that they are the
plaintiff's. Accordingly all that a plaintiff can ask is that, so far as is con-
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sistent with the defendant's fundamental privilege to make and sell what he
chooses, precautions shall be taken to prevent confusion as to the source of the
product. Elgin National Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co. (igoo) 179
U. S. 665, 21 Sup. Ct. 27o ("Elgin" watches); Samson Cordage Works v.
Puriton Co. (i915, C. C. A. 6th) 211 Fed. 6o8 (window cords). If there is
evidence of positive confusion as to source, caused by the imitation of the
plaintiff's product either as to name, shape, color or appearance, equity will
compel a defendant to take such precautions as will afford the maximum
amount of protection to the plaintiff and the minimum amount of limitation on
defendant's freedom of trade. Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Mfg.
Co. (I9ig) 22o U. S. 446, 31 Sup. Ct. 456 ("Rubbero" goods); Garret & Co.
v. Sweet Valley Wine Co. (1918, N. D. Oh.) 251 Fed. 371 ("Virginia Dare"
wines). Where the confusion is due to imitation of the product itself great
difficulty often arises in the application of this doctrine, for a change in appear-
ance of the article may be impossible without a destruction of its function. In
such case the courts, ever jealous of creating a perpgtual monopoly, refuse to
grant the plaintiff any relief. Marvel Co. v. Pearl (1914, C. C. A. 2d) 133 Fed.
X6o ("Whirling" spray syringe); Diamond Expansion Bolt Co. v. U. S. Expan-
sion Bolt Co. (ig1, N. Y.) 177 App. Div. 554, 164 N. Y. Supp. 443 (bolts and
shields). A fortiori is this true where the connotation as to source has been
built up under the protection of a patent and the patent has expired. Daniels
v. Electric Hose Co. (I9i6, C. C. A. 3d) 23x Fed. 827. However, where the
appearance of the article may be changed without destroying its usefulness
for the purpbse intended, the courts will not hesitate to compel the defendant
so to distinguish his product as to cause the least possible confusion. Yale &
Towne Mfg. Co. v. Adler (i9o7, C. C. A. 2d) 154 Fed. 37 (locks); Ruchmore
v. Manhatten Screw Co. (i9o8, C. C. A. 2d) 163 Fed.'939 (auto-lamps); Coca
Cola Co. v. Gayola Co. (1912, C. C. A. 6th) 2oo Fed. 72o (beverage). It is
submitted that the principal case properly placed upon the defendant the bur-
den of showing that the placing of a distinguishing mark upon the product was
not commercially feasible and would result in destroying his ability to combete
with the plaintiff. It should be noted that Hough, J., who concurred in the
result, expressed the view that the plaintiff would be entitled to have distin-
guishing marks placed upon the defendant's product even' though that would
make it commercially impossible for him to compete.
VENDOR'S LINs-UNLIQUIDATED CLAIMs-BREAcm OF CONTRAcT TO SuppoRT
GRANTOR.-A father conveyed to his daughter a farm, taking in exchange her
promise to care for and support him until death and to pay his funeral
expenses. The daughter did none of these things. In a suit against the
daughter the administrator of the father asked not only for a personal judg-
ment but also for the enforcement of an equitable lien on the land in question
to secure the payment pf the amount to be found due for breach of the con-
tract. Held, that the administrator was entitled to the relief asked. Zoeller v.
Loi (i918, Ind.) 12o N. E. 623.
As the daughter never performed any part of her agreement, the father
would in many states have been entitled in equity to have the land restored to
him and to an accounting of rents and profits. McClelland V. McClelland
(1898) 176 Ill. 83, 51 N. E. 559; Lowman v. Craurford (igoi) 99 Va. 688, 4o
S. E. x. This is on the ground that where a defendant has wholly repudiated
or violated his contractual duty to the plaintiff, equity deems it only fair that
restitution in specie should be decreed. Other jurisdictions deny relief, on the
ground that the remedy for breach of contract is adequate. Gardner v.
Knight (i899) 124 Ala. 273, 27 So. 298; Anderson v. Gaines (igoo) 156 Mo.
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664, 57 S. W. 726. Apparently courts of law have not developed a quasi-con-
tractual remedy for restitution in the form of a judgment for the value of the
land in an action of indebitatus assumpsit. Woodward, Qua.si-Contracts, 416.
In states which deny specific restitution in equity, this is entirely logical. In
those granting equitable restitution, however, this result is probably due in
part to the superiority of the equitable remedy, but also in part to the fact
that indebitatus counts for "land sold and conveyed" were relatively rare at
common law, especially as used to enforce quasi-contractual obligations. They
were, however, not unknown. Nugent v. Teachout (1887) 67 Mich. 571, 35
N. W. 254. The grantor may of course sue the grantee for damages for breach
of contract; and, if the agreement is to pay money for land conveyed, he may
claim in England and many of our states a vendor's lien for the purchase price.
In other jurisdictions no such lien is recognized unless provided for by agree-
ment of the parties. Story, Equity Jurisprudence (i4th ed.) sec. 1624.
Whether such a lien exists where the agreement is not to pay money but to
furnish support, etc., is a question upon which the authorities are in 'conflict.
The fact that the claim of the vexndor is for an unliquidated amount and will
extend over so long a period of time has led many courts to reject the doc-
trine as inapplicable to such a situation. Arlin v. Brown (1862) 44 N. H. -o2;
39 Cyc. 1792. Other states, however-of which Indiana is one-allow the lien
even in such cases. Hamilton v. Barricklow (1884) 96 Ind. 398. Under the
Indiana law, therefore, the result reached in the principal case is correct.
